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Legal relations can exist only between persons as members of organ-
ized society. A societal system and the singling out of two of its
members are the essentials upon which legal relations are predicated.
In legal contemplation society is grouped in twos with complex permu-
tations. Where one member has a legal right, some other member has
a legal duty; where one has a privilege, another has a no-right, etc.
The whole system is inherently correlated. Upon this basis society
functions. Society formulates the policy which will promote its wel-
fare. If an individual runs amuck society penalizes him. The perti-
nent question is, what will or will not society do on behalf of one of its
members and against another? In either case legal relations exist."
It should be emphasized that there are no "inalienable" or "absolute"
rights, privileges, etc.2  The term "right," when used in the Hohfeld
sense, means merely that one member of society has an affirmative claim
against another member, which claim society will enforce.3 The basis
'It remained for the late Professor Hohfeld, in a constructive contribution to
the law, to formulate a system of.opposites and correlatives including eight con-
cepts with which, it is believed, all the legal relations of persons can be expressed.
See article by Hohfeld entitled Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning (I913) 23 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 16. His classification is as
follows:
Opposites right privilege power immunityO no-right duty disability liability
Correlatives right privilege power immunityduty no-right liability disability
Careful study should also be made of another article by Professor Hohfeld under
the same title, (1917) 26 id. 71o, and of an article by Professor Corbin entitled
Legal Analysis and Terminology (igig) 29 id. 163, and one by Professor Cook,
Hohfeld's Contributions to the Science of Law (igig) 28 id. 721. But see Ko-
courek, The Hohfeld System of Fundamental Legal Concepts (192o) 15 ILL. L.
REV. 24.
It is to the merit of the Hohfeld analysis that it offers a systematic arrangement
of legal relations, and that it gives to each of its terms a definite and specific
meaning. Any system that tends to obviate the use of important words in double,
triple, and even quadruple senses should be welcomed in the realms of legal
thought. The word "right" is, perhaps, the most abused, being commonly used
in as many as four different senses. One is reminded of the blind men of old
defining an elephant.
2 Relations based upon constitutional limitations which are frequently referred
to as "inalienable rights" present a question outside of the scope of this study
and are not discussed herein.
'Cf. Duguit, Progress of Continental Law in the 19th Century (Continental
T -1re T-T-+_-l Q.,;_e -Qlr'I ~~q
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of the "right" concept, as well as that of the other seven concepts in the
Hohfeld scheme, is in policy. This policy prescribes what the legal re-
lations between persons shall be. The individual is merely part of the
scheme. A man has a right or a rio-right, a privilege or a duty, as
society dictates. And society issues or withholds its commands for
purely practical reasons. A has a right and B a duty if the orderly
functioning of society is thereby proinoted; otherwise B has a privilege
and A a no-right. Herein lies the test.
It is often said that A has a right that B shall not, without legal
justification or excuse, cause A harm. 4 But when is there a right, and
when a justification or excuse? This is a question of policy over which
society deliberates and which it determines in its own interest. A and
B are merely creatures of a system. The particular legal relation
involved between A and B is but one of many existing between A and
B, A and C, B and C, C and D etc., the aggregate of which we call
organized society. Societal organization thus has its basis in the control
society exerts for its own preferment over the specific legal relations
between persons.
A tort always involves the violation of a right and the corresponding
breach of a duty. The right violated is a primary one; the resulting
right (to damages) is secondary.5 The primary right and duty in
torts are generally in rem; the secondary right and duty are always in
personam. A has a right not to be assaulted by B. A has similar
rights against every member of society, each one of whom is under a
corresponding duty to A. In this instance, A's right is primary and
in rem. Should any person (B) assault A, a secondary 'right in A
and a corresponding duty in B would immediately result. The second-
ary right and duty are in personam, since this relation exists only be-
tween A and B. 7
Right-duty 'relations. In the Hohfeld scheme right-duty relations
are of primary importance. Our immediate problem is to study the
right and duty concepts in connection with torts. Pertaining to torts,
when will society command an act or forbearance by one of its members
at the instigation of another? The harm element comes first for dis-
cussion. A has a primary right that B shall not cause him harm. The
'See Pollock, Torts (iith ed. 1g2o) i; Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent
(I894) 8 HARv. L. REv. L; Wigmore, Tripartite Division of Torts, id. 2=0.
'Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology (1gig) 29 YAIE LAw JoURNAL, 163,
I71.
'For a discussion of in rem and in personain used see Hohfeld's article (1917)
26 YAL-E LAw JOURNAL, 710.
'See Pollock, Torts (ilth ed. 1920) 2; see further, Pollock, A First Book of
Jurisprudence (4th ed. 1918) 84-94, where rights in rein are referred to as "im-
personal" rights, and rights in personam as "personal" rights. Cf. Bigelow,
Torts (8th ed. i9o7) 12, 13.
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sufferance of harm by A is one of the operative facts which, together
with others, gives rise to a secondary right in A to damages from 
B.
Omit the harm and there is no violation of a right, and correspondingly
no breach of a duty. This harm element may assume a variety 
of
forms. The physical injury from a battery; the mere mental appre-
hension of a battery, called an assault; words uttered or written, 
or
caricatures and the like affecting reputation; injuries resulting from
deceit; injuries resulting from unfounded legal prosecutions; inter-
ference with copyrights and patents; injuries due to negligence; an-
noyances such as disagreeable odors, sounds, and the like; interference
with privacy; interference with advantageous relations between per-
sons-these are some of the specific harms, which, when suffered, form
a basis for the recovery of compensation.
A person having suffered harm, organized society, at the instance of
the injured party, seeks to fasten responsibility. This involves a dis-
cussion of the term "cause" and of the operative features of the causal
act or omission. We have nothing to do with cause and effect in their
broad significance; our problem is with legal cause. The causal con-
duct must be operative in the legal sense; otherwise new legal relations
cannot arise.
Threading its way through much of the field of torts, and closely
linked with causality, is the element of foresight. A man, it is said,
must foresee such harm as the average prudent and intelligent person
could have foreseen if similarly situated. The question, it is to be
observed, is not what the individual who brought on the harm could
have foreseen, but rather his conduct is judged by a standard-that
which the average person could have foreseen. What this means is
that a man's conduct is actually judged by twelve individual standards
-the jurors who sit in the case-and the standard of the average man
is the result, more or less, of a blending of the twelve. The problem
as to foresight might be stated in this manner. If from the standpoint
of the average man there was a strong likelihood that harm would result
from a certain line of conduct, and harm has followed, it is said to have
been done intentionally; if there was a fair probability of some harm
(not necessarily any particular harm), it is said to have been done
negligently; if there was no probability of harm, it is called an 
acci-
dent."
In the case of intentional harms the question of causality is simple.
The intentional act followed by the injury always bears the relation of
legal cause and effect. What a man deliberately plans is the legal con-
sequence of his act.9 Where a man plans harm, and it results, he is
'Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent (1894) 8 HARV. L. REV. i. Cf. Salmond,
Jurisprudence (4th ed. 1913) 336, 337.
"Any intentional consequence of an act is proximate." Terry, Proximate Con-
sequences in the Law of Torts (1914) 28 HARv. L. REv. 10, 17. And see Pollock,
Torts (iith ed. 1920) 334; Salmond, Torts (5th ed. 1920) 21-22.
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often made to answer in damages, not only for the harm intended, but
also for uncontemplated consequences. Thus, if A strikes B intending
merely to knock him down, and B has a thin skull, which is fractured on
the pavement, A must pay damages for B's broken skull. Further, if A
intentionally strikes at B and hits C, the latter can iecover damages from
A." Here, to be sure, A did not intend to strike C, yet he did intend
harm, and it resulted. Observe that legally the inquiry is not into A's
actual state of mind. The jury determines the intention from the con-
sequences of the act. There having been a strong probability of harm,
the inference is that it was done intentionally. But attend to the fact
that even though legal cause is established, it does not necessarily follow
that the person injured can recover damages. This right depends upon
a rule of policy which will be further considered under privilege-
no-right relations.
Where the likelihood of harm is not so strong, and yet there is a fairprobability that some harm will result from a man's conduct, he must
indemnify the party injured, provided the act or omission was the legal
cause of the injury and provided the act or omission was without legaljustification or excuse. Our inquiry is now in the field of negligence.
The important elements to be considered in this connection are harm,
foresight, causation, and legal justification or excuse. The harm ele-
ment, previously discussed, is 'ever an important one in torts. The
excuse or justification element will receive later consideration in con-
nection with privilege-no-right relations. Our problem for immediate
study is concerned with foresight and causation.
The elements of foresight and causation are often confused. 1 Fore-
sight is important in establishing negligence. Negligence is deter-
mined by the probable results of a man's acts as foreseeable by the
average man similarly situated.' 2 If harm was not foreseeable, there
need be no further inquiry for in that event there was no negligence.
Only in case it is determined that harm was foreseeable, does the fur-
ther problem of legal cause become material. Observe that proba-
bility of harm and want of 'foresight do not establish legal causality.
For example, where the defendant, a town, had wrongfully left open
an excavation in its streets, and the plaintiff, a constable, in passing
with a prisoner, was thrown into the pit by the prisoner and was in-jured, it was held that no matter how negligent the defendant was,
the negligence was not the legal cause of the injury.'
Assuming, then, that both harm and negligence have been estab-
lished, whencan it be said that the act and the harm bear the relation of
"James v. Campbell (1832, C. P.) 5 C. & P. 372.
" Smith v. London and S. W. Ry. (1874) L. R. 6 C. P. 14, 21; Christianson v.Chicago, St- Paul Ry. (1896) 67 Minn. 94, 69 N. W. 64o.
'Bohlen, The Probability of Natural Consequences as the Test of Liability in
Negligence (igoi) 4o A-m. L. Ri ,. 148, 161.
'Alexander v. Town of New Castle (x888) 115 Ind. 51, 17 N. E. 200.
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legal cause and effect? Beginning with Lord Bacon's maxim, in jure
non remota causa sed proxima spectatur,1 4 various rules have been
offered.' 5 None, however, has been entirely satisfactory. Much of
the difficulty has been due, as has been suggested, to a want of dif-
ferentiation between foresight and causation. Further, the distinction
is often overlooked between a fact and an inference from a fact. Legal
cause is a mental conception.'8
Harm may result from an act or an omission. If from the latter, to
establish legal cause, there must have been a primary duty to act.
Further, this duty is broken only in case the doing of the act would
have prevented the harm, for if the result would have happened not-
withstanding the omission, legal cause is not established. This prin-
ciple is illustrated in the following case: A negligently left a hole
unguarded in some ice near a highway, and B's horses, which had
become frightened, ran into it and were drowned. It was held that,
since the speed of the horses was so great that even if the guard re-
quired by statute had been erected it would not have stopped them, A's
omission was not the legal cause of the injury.'7
Where there is a primary duty not to do an act, the doing of which
will probably result in harm, our inquiry, in relation to legal cause,
can be stated as follows: (i) Did the act directly cause the result;
or (2) did the act become the direct and efficient cause of setting
another force or forces in motion which directly caused the result; or
(3) did the force of the act come to rest in a position which exposed.
it to the force of a non-voluntary agency which in the light of com-
mon experience would probably create a new risk or increase an exist--
ing one, from which the harm directly resulted?i8 In any case, it is
submitted, legal cause has been established. We shall consider these
proposals in their order.
Where there is the relation Qf cause and effect between the act and
the harm, legal cause is established when the harm is the direct result
of the act. Of the three proposals stated, this one offers the least
difficulty. Examples are numerous. Ordinarily in cases of this.
nature the question of cause is not litigated. The following facts were,
perhaps, unusual enough to deserve notice. The defendant negli-
"Bacon, Maxims, i.
1' See discussion by Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort (1911-1912) 25 HAV.
L. REV. 103, 223, 303.
"Legal proximity of causation may be defined as that conception of cause and
effect which has been adopted by the courts as the test by which to ascertain
whether a particular harm is to be ascribed to a particular act or omission as its
consequence as a prerequisite to the imposition of legal responsibility therefor.'
Bohlen, Contributory Negligence (iog) 21 HARv. L. REy. 233, 234.
"Sowles v. Moore (1893) 65 Vt. 322, 26 AtI. 629.
"See article by Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act (192o) 33 HAv.
L. REv. 633. The writer finds himself much indebted to Professor Beale for this
able article.
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gently ran his tug against the fender of a bridge. The force of the
blow was transmitted through the intervening piles to where the plain-
tiff stood and his foot was caught. The defendant's act was held
to be the legal cause of the plaintiff's injury.19
Where the result was not the direct consequence of the act, and
other forces have contributed, an act may yet be the legal cause of
the harm where the force of the act directly sets other forces in motion
and these in turn directly cause the result. The celebrated squib case
furnishes an illustration. A threw a lighted squib into a building full
of people. It fell near a person who instantly cast it from him.
Another did the same. The last time it exploded near B and blinded
his eye. A's act was held to be the legal cause of B's injury.20  So
where A, driving a horse hitched to a sleigh, negligently ran into
another horse hitched to a sleigh which B was driving, causing B's
horse to run away, and as a result C was injured, C's injury was the
legal consequence of A's act.2 1
When the force of a man's act has spent itself, a court will not, as a
rule, follow it further than to its quiescent state. Yet where through
negligence it comes to rest in an exposed position where it is subjected
to non-voluntary agencies, which ordinarily create a new risk or increase
an existing one, and from which harm directly results, the act is the
legal cause of this consequence. Such a case arose where a cutter, as
a result of negligent navigation, struck a shoal just outside of the
plaintiff's sea-wall. The vessel there became unmanageable and was
driven by wind and tide against the sea-wall and was damaged. The
court held that the damage was the legal consequence of the defendant's
act.2 2 Ths case should be distinguished from the following one:
The defendant negligently permitted water to run down a gutter to a
grating where it would have harmlessly flowed into a sewer had it not
been for an exceptionally severe frost which caused the grating to
freeze over, resulting in injury to the plaintiff's horse which slipped
on the ice. There the frost was not an ordinary risk and the plaintiff
did not recover .2
We have been dealing with cases in which the element of foresight
was an important ingredient in establishing a duty. In some instances,
however, a duty may arise irrespective of foresight. Here it may be
said in all truth that a man acts at his peril. Such cases frequently
arise in relation to trespasses to property by men or animal, violation
of statutory duties, injuries received from vicious and wild animals,
and in certain cases in connection with the use of land.
A, the owner of land, has a right that B shall not enter his land.
"Hill v. Winsor (I875) ii8 Mass. 251.
"Scott v. Shepherd (1773, C. P.) 2 W. BI. 892.
" McDonald v. Snelling (I867, Mass.) 14 All. 29o.
"Bailiffs of Romney Marsh v. Trinity House (i87o) L. R. 5 Exch. 204.
"Sharp v. Powell (1872) L. R. 7 C. P. 253.
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If B enters without permission, he has committed a trespass for which
he is answerable. The harm and causative elements are present, but
foresight does not enter in at all. A right has been violated by B, caus-
ing new legal relations between him and A irrespective of B's intention,
or of any knowledge that he is breaking a duty.2' The same is true
in trespass to, or the conversion of, goods.2 5 The rule is fully as strict
in relation to animals. The owner of an animal may have taken all
reasonable precautions to prevert its escape, yet if it merely crosses
another's boundary, a trespass to real estate has been committed for
which the owner of the animal is answerable.2 6
The risk connected with the keeping of dangerous animals bears a
close analogy to the above. If the animal is domesticated, the owner
is answerable for harm caused by it, in cases other than trespass to
land, only if he knew it .to be vicious. But where he aware of such
propensities and it does mischief, he is held accountable without proof
of negligence.2 7 In case the animal is ferae -naturae the owner is said
to "secure it at his peril," and it is immaterial whether he knew it to be
dangerous or not.2s In. connection with these cases it should be ob-
served, however, that the owner of a wild or vicious animal is only
answerable for the consequences of its ferocity. In other respects he
is responsible only in case negligence is proved against him. To illus-
trate, A, the owner of a bear, was leading it upon a highway and B's
horse, also on the highway, was frightened by the bear and ran away
injuring B. It was held that B could not recover from A since it was
not established that A was negligent.
29
In 1866 the Exchequer Chamber in England laid down a rule in
the famous case of Fletcher v. Rylands8" as follows:
"We think the true rule of law is that the person who for his own
purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything
likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his peril, and if he
does not do so is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is
"Pollock, Torts (iith ed. ig2o) 9; cf. Holmes, The Common Law (i88i) 97.
'Bruch v. Carter (1867, N. J.) 3 Vroom, 554.
"Noyes v. Colby (855) 30 N. H. 143. This rule has been relaxed in some
jurisdictions of the United States. See Wagner v. Bissell (i856) 3 Iowa, 396.
'Mason v. Keeling (1699, -) 12 Mod. 332; cf. DeGray v. Murray (i9o3) 69
N. J. L. 458. The German Civil Code, sec. 833, provides: "If a human being is
killed, or if the body or health of a human being is injured, or a thing damaged
by an animal, its keeper is bound to indemnify the party injured for the damages
arising therefrom."
The Civil Code of Spain, art. i9o5, has this provision: "The possessor of an
animal, or odfe who uses the same is liable for any damages it may cause, even if
such animal shall escape from him or stray away. This liability shall cease only
in case the damage should arise from vis major or from the fault of the person
who may have suffered it."
"May v. Burdett (1846) 9 Q. B. ioi.
"Bostock-Ferari Co. v. Brocksmith (9o5) 34 Ind. App. 566, 73 N. E. 282.
" (i866) L. M. i Exch. 265.
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the natural consequence of its escape. He can excuse himself by
showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff's default; or per-
haps that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of
God."
The decision in this case was later affirmed in the House of Lords.3 1
This case has been followed in England and to some extent in this coun-
try. Some jurisdictions in the United States have, however, flatly
refused to accept its lead. 32 It is maintained by these courts that the
element of foresight should be a determining factor in cases of this
nature. And even in England the tendency of the later cases has been
to encourage exceptions to the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher.33
Another class of cases in which foresight is not an element of re-
sponsibility, arises in connection with the violation of statutory duties.
It is important, in this relation, to distinguish between prohibitory legis-
lation and legislation requiring affirmative conduct.34 A violates a
statute by selling liquor to B the husband of C. B, as a result, becomes
intoxicated to the extent that he loses the natural control of his mental
faculties and is killed while driving a team of horses. Before the pas-
sage of the statute, A's civil responsibility depended upon proof of the
probability of harm resulting from his act (i. e. proof of negligence),
and upon proof of legal causation. After the statute the sole pertinent
question was whether the breach of the statute was the legal cause of
the harm.' '5 If it was, the plaintiff recovers. The court held, in the
case stated, that C was entitled to damages from A.3 6 All question as
to foresight had disappeared. Observe that this case involved a pro-
hibitory statute.
Should the statute require affirmative conduct and the violation com-
plained of be an omission, a civil action may be based thereon only in
case the harm resulting is of a nature which the statute sought to
-prevent. The case of Gorris v. Scott37 here serves as an illustration.
In that case cattle carried on a ship were washed overboard for want of
appliances prescribed by an act of parliament for certain sanitary pur-
poses. The ship owner was held not to be responsible to the owner of
the cattle by reason of the breach of the statute. The act was passed
for the purpose only of preventing the spread of disease among ani-
mals. The plaintiff's loss was due to other reasons and his case, if any,
was a common-law action for negligence.
3t Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) L. R. 3 H. L. 330.
Brown v. Collins (873) 53 N. H. 442.
' See Nichols v. Marsland (1876) L. R. 2 Exch. i.
* See article by Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action (194) 27 HARV. L.
REv. 317.
i Street, Foundations of Legal Liability (I906) 172.
Wall v. State (1894) io Ind. App 530, 38 N. E. i9o.
'r (I874) L. R. 9 Exch. 125.
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Privilege-no-right relations. A clear conception of the term "priv-
ilege" together with its correlative "no-right" and its opposite "duty"
is of importance to an understanding of tort-relations. Privilege de-
notes permission. It is the absence of a duty. If A has a privilege,
some other member of society (B) has a no-right. Where A has the
privilege to walk on the highway, B has a corresponding no-right that
A shall not walk on the highway. Where A has the privilege of
defending himself against the attack of B, the latter has no right that
he shall not do so.
Conduct is often of such a nature that it is difficult to determine its
legal significance. A is in the habit of taking an afternoon nap.. His
siesta is permissive as long as he is under no duty to B (or some other
person) to keep awake. But, were A a flagman and were B injured
for want of a danger signal from A because A had fallen asleep, society
would at the instance of B penalize A. In the first example A had a
privilege to take a nap; in the latter he was under a duty not to take
one. The illustrations given are extreme. Often it is a difficult ques-
tion whether the duty or the privilege element shall control. In such
cases conduct is scrutinized in its minutest details for the decisive fact.
The privilege may hinge on a spoken word or the duty upon a gesture3 s
The justification or excuse element in torts properly falls for discussion
under privilege-no-right relations, and the question of privilege or
duty, herein involved, is frequently a close one. The determining fac-
tor, one way or the other, is ever ultimately a question of policy.39
The holder of a right often can consent to its extinguishment and
thereby create a privilege in another who formerly had a duty, and
create a no-right in himself. Thus, A, the owner of a piece of land,
has a right that B shall not trespass. But A can grant B the privilege of
entering the land. B's duty not to enter is thereby extinguished and a
privilege is substituted. Again, A has a right that he shall not be
assaulted by B, but if A and B are arrayed on opposite sides in a foot-
ball game, A has assumed the ordinary risks of the game, and B's con-
duct is to that extent privileged. But if A and B by consent stage a
mutual affray the conduct of neither is privileged. Policy here becomes
an obvious factor. Because of it A and B cannot extinguish the exist-
ing right-duty relation between them and either has, as a result of the
assault and battery, a secondary right to damages from the other.
40
' E. g. in Tuberville v. Savage (1669, K. B.) i Mod. 3, a man put his hand on
his sword and said: "If it were not.assize-time, I would not take this language
from you." The state of mind indicated by the words was absence of intention
to assault, and the court held that it was not an assault. In Stephcns v. MyVers
(183o, K.B.) 4 C. & P. 349, the defendant advanced with his fists clenched toward
the plaintiff. This was held to be an assault.
'Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent (1894) 8 HARv. L. REv. 1, 3.
"Bell v. Hansley (1855, N. C.) 3 Jones, 131. But see contra Lykins v. H1amrick
(r9ii) 144 Ky. 8O, 137 S. W. 852.
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Numerous cases arise where society refuses its aid to the person
harmed because of his own blameworthy conduct. A has a right to
damages from B because of injuries received from B's wild animals.
But where B held in captivity some zebras, which were tied in a barn,
and A walked into this barn and began stroking one of the zebras and
was as a result severely injured, the court held that A could not recover
damages, because he had contributed in bringing the injury upon him-
self.4 A's conduct here had the effect of depriving him of a right and
the resulting legal relation between A and B was a privilege-no-right
one. Similarly A has a right not to be beaten by B, but if A strikes B
first; the latter, under circumstances of self defense, has the privilege of
striking back, and society will refuse its aid to A should he sue B for
an assault and battery.4 2
The same principles are basic in contributory negligence. A person
who, by his own conduct, has contributed in bringing harm on himself
cannot recover damages. A defendant is under a duty not to injure
negligently a plaintiff, but if the plaintiff's conduct, combined with that
of the defendant, has brought on the harm, a rule of policy lays the
weight of its emphasis on the plaintiff's fault, denies him the right, and
holds the defendant's conduct privileged.' BHut in such a case the
plaintiff and the defendant must each be judged by the same standard
of foresight. For instance, where the probability of harm resulting
from the defendant's conduct is so great that the harm following is said
to have been intentional and the probability of harm resulting from the
plaintiff's conduct is not so great, so that his acts are said to have been
merely negligent, the defendant cannot rely upon the plaintiff's negli-
gence as a defense. Thus, where A sued B for an assault and battery,
and B answered that A's negligence provoked it, the court held that this
was not a defense.4 4
So also, the rule does not apply where there has not been an equal
opportunity to avert the harm. The so-called doctrine of "last clear
chance" is here involved. An inquiry into this rule is beset with dif-
ficulties. A solution, it is aften said, lies in a distinction between
"proximate" and "remote" cause, or between "concurrent" and "suc-
'"Marlor vi. Ball (igoo, C. A.) 16 T. L. R. 239.
'State v. Sherman (i889) i6 R_ I. 631, 18 Atl. o4o.
'It is submitted that the doctrine in admiralty of equal division of damages
offers the more logical solution. See The Max Morris (189o) 137 U. S. I- ii
Sup. Ct 29.
The German Civil Code, sec. 254, has this provision: "If the injured party has
contributed to the cause of the injury, the obligation for indemnity as well as
the extent of the indemnity to be rendered depends upon the question, whether
the injury has been caused mainly by one party or by the other."
See also U. S Comp. St. 1913, sec. 8659, relating to actions by employees against
common carriers.
"Steinmetz v. Kelly (188o) 72 Ind. 442.
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cessive" negligence.4 5 It is obvious that these are qualifying terms
which merely hamper thought. The problem is to fix responsibility.
This doctrine, as a limitation on the theory of contributory negli-
gence, had its origin with the celebrated donkey case4" decided in Eng-
land in 1842. The facts of that case were briefly as follows: The
plaintiff had fettered the fore feet of an ass and turned it out to graze
on the highway. The defendant, driving three horses hitched to a
wagon, coming down a slight descent at a brisk speed, ran against the
ass and injured it. A'direction to the jury, that whatever they thought
of the plaintiff's conduct, he still was entitled to his remedy if the acci-
dent might have been avoided by the exercise of ordinary care on the
part of the driver, was held proper. The rule of this case, though
severely criticized, has been followed in England and generally in the
United States.47 The following is proposed as a statement of the prin-
ciple involved: (i) Where the negligence of both plaintiff and defend-
ant has contributed to the harm but the plaintiff has deprived himself
of the ability to avert it, or, having been able to extricate himself, was
unconscious of his peril, and the probability of harm had become ob-
vious to the defendant in time to avert it, and he did not do so; or (2)
where the plaintiff has negligently deprived himself of the ability to
avert the harm, and the defendant, whose negligence contributed, rea-
sonably should have become aware of the plaintiff's peril in time to
prevent the harm, but he did not, the defendant in either (i) or (2)
is answerable to the plaintiff for the result.48
Reasons of policy furnish the excuse or justification for harm under
various other circumstances. A rule of policy prescribes that a man
may perpetrate an assault and battery in defense of family or property,
or in matters of discipline. Policy is the underlying factor establishing
the privilege element in connection with acts for which a person would
otherwise be answerable in an action for defamation. Thus, A is
under a duty not to slander B, but if A makes statements in court as
judge, counsel, or witness, these statements are privileged, provided
they were pertinent and material to the case . 4
Si Street, Foundations of Legal Liability (i9o6) 136.
Davies v. Mann (1842, Exch.) 1o M. & W. 546. The principle was actually
recognized in an earlier case, Butterfield v. Forrester (i8og, K. B.) ii East, 6o.
See discussion, Schofield, Davies v. Mann: Theory of Contributory Negligence
(89o) 3 HAv. L. REv. 363.
' Radley v. L. & N. W. Ry., (1876) L. R. i A. C. 754; Fuller v. Illinois
Central Ry. (9I) 1oo Miss. 705, 56 So. 783.
daSee an able comment by Professor Thurston (192o) 29 YALE LAW JouRNAL,
896.
""It seems to be settled by the English authorities that judges, counsel, parties,
and witnesses are absolutely exempted from liability to an action for defamatory
words published in the course of judicial proceedings; and that the same doctrine
is generally held in the American courts, with the qualification, as to parties,
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A merchant has the privilege of offering his goods for sale at a low
price even though his purpose and the result of his action is to injure a
competitor. 50 In an Ohio case5 the defendant built a high wall on his
property close to the plaintiff's house.shutting off light and air from the
plaintiff's windows. The court held that the plaintiff had no remedy,
and that it was of no consequence what the defendant's motives were.
So where the plaintiff was a lower riparian owner and the defendant
an upper one and the latter cut the timber on his land which shaded the
stream, as a result of which the water in the stream evaporated, the
plaintiff was denied an injunction irrespective of the defendant's inten-
tion.52
It is believed, however, that there is a tendency to qualify the rule
above stated, and to lay emphasis on the question whether or not the
person causing the harm had, in some degree, a beneficial object in view.
Thus, in a Michigan case, 53 where the defendant erected a fence on his
land for the purpose of shutting out the light and air from the plain-
tiff's windows in a building on land adjoining, the court ordered the
fence removed. In a later Michigan case54 the bad motives of the de-
fendant appear to have been uppermost, yet, since the court found the
obstruction served also a useful purpose, it refused its aid to the plain-
tiff. In another familiar case where the plaintiff was a barber in a
small town and the defendant, a banker, had set up a rival shop for the
purpose of destroying the plaintiff's trade, the plaintiff was permitted
to recover.55
Our inquiry here leads us, perforce, into a study of certain leading
cases involving an interference with the relations between the plaintiff
and third persons. The celebrated case of Lumley v. Gye56 is of first
significance. In that case the plaintff had entered into a contract with
counsel, and witnesses, that their statements made in the course of an action must
be pertinent and material to the case." McLaughlin v. Cowley (1879) I27 Mass.
326, 319.
' Passaic Print Works v. Ely & Walker Co. (igoo, C. C. A. 8th) IO5 Fed. 163.
But see the dissenting opinion in this case by Sanborn, J., at p. 167, where he con-
tends that the defendant's conduct is privileged only where his acts are in the
furtherance of a legitimate trade purpose. And see article by Ames, How Far
an Act May be a Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor (9o5) 18
HARV. L. REv. 411.
"Letts v. Kessler (i896) 54 Oh. St. 73, 42 N. E. 765.
"
2Fisher v. Feige (io2) 137 Calif. 39, 69 Pac. 618.
'Flaherty v. Moran (I89O) 8i Mich. 52, 45 N. W. 381. In many states statutes
have been passed declaring a "spite fence" to be a nuisance.
Ku--niak v. Kosininski (1895) io7 Mich. 444, 65 N. W. 275.
'5 Tuttle v. Buck (19o9) IO7 Minn. 145, iI9 N. W. 946. The German Civil Code,
sec. 226, provides: "The exercise of a right is not permissible if it can have no
other purpose than to damage another."
"' (1853, Q. B.) 2 El. & BI. 216. And see article by Pound, The End of Law as
Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines (1914) 27 HARV. L. REv. 195.
TORT-RELATIONS
Miss Wagner, a singer, under the terms of which she agreed to sing
for the plaintiff in his theater, and nowhere else. The defendant, a
business rival of the plaintiff, with knowledge of the agreement between
the plaintiff and Miss Wagner, enticed her to leave the plaintiff's em-
ployment. The court held that the defendant had violated a legal right
and gave the plaintiff his remedy in tort.57 The crux of the problem
is in conflicting factors. Is it policy to forbid or permit such conduct?
The court correctly decided in this case that the defendant was under a
legal duty not to interfere with the plaintiff's contractual relations.
But had the defendant merely dissuaded Miss Wagner, with the honest
purpose of benefiting her, and not himself, the privilege element might
have governed. 58 The principle announced in Lumley v. Gye is gener-
ally accepted as law in the United States.5"
It should be observed however, that the harm, for which a legal
remedy was given in that case, resulted from an interference with con-
tractual relations, and that the plaintiff had a further remedy in con-
tract against the party in privity of contract with him. Closely
connected with the doctrine of that case a further problem evolves.
What are the resulting legal relations where harm is caused, not from
dissuading a person from a contractual duty, but rather in influencing
one who owes no legal duty to the plaintiff, but with whom the plaintiff
has merely certain advantageous connections-in existence or in ex-
pectancy-so to act that harm results to the plaintiff ?
No general solution of this vexed question is contemplated and only
a few deductions are offered. It is believed that reasons of policy gen-
erally favor a privilege-no-right relation. An early case 0 exempli-
fies this principle. Two masters in a grammar school in a certain local-
ity sought damages from another master who had set up a rival school
in the same town. The new master evidently lowered the tuition fees,
for it is alleged "that whereas the plaintiffs had formerly received 4od.
or two shillings a quarter from each child, now they got only I2d."
"In Quinn v. Leatharn [1goi] A. C. 495, Lord MacNaghten, in referring to
the case of Lumley v. Gye, said, at p. 57o: "Speaking for myself, I have no
hesitation in saying that I think the decision was right, not on the ground of
malicious intent-that was not, I think the gist of the action-but on the ground
that a violation of a right committed knowingly is a cause of action, and that it
is a violation of a legal right to interfere with contractual relations recognized
by law, if there is no sufficient justification for the interference.
"That interference with contractual relations known to the law may in some
cases be justified is not, in my opinion, open to doubt. For example, I think that
a father who discovered that a child of his had been enticed into an engagement
to marry a person of immoral character would not only be justified in interfering
to prevent that contract from being carried into effect, but would greatly fail in
his duty to his child if he did not." Sterling, L. J., in Glamorgan Co. z. South
Wales Miners' Federation [19o3] 2 K. B. 545, 577.
" Walker v. Cronin (1871) lO7 Mass. 555.
'Anonymous (141) Y. B.-ii Hen. IV, 47, pl. 21.
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It was held that the plaintiffs had no actionable cause. Mogul Steam-
ship Co. v. McGregor"' is a leading case in this field. The facts in
that case were that the plaintiff and the defendants were engaged in
carrying tea from China to England. The defendant offered special
discounts to exporters who' employed them alone; they sent their ships
to China authorizing their agents to underbid the plaintiff even to
accepting freight at unprofitable rates, and their agents were forbidden
to act as agents for the plaintiff The court held that the plaintiff had
no cause of action.
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So in the field of labor disputes certain labor unions had combined
for the purpose of obtaining a monopoly of employment for the mem-
bers of their local unions in the several occupations in which they were
engaged. In furtherance of these purposes they had boycotted the
plaintiff and all persons for whom he had furnished labor or material,
and persons by whom he had been employed, and had instituted strikes
in all cases where their demands were not complied with. The court
held that individuals may work for whom ther please, and quit work
when they please, as long as they do not violate their contracts of em-
ployment; that they may refuse to work with non-union labor where
their object is to strengthen the union, and where it is for their own
interests, and the means used are not prohibited nor contrary to
policy.
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Granting then that acts of persuasion are generally privileged, even
though the persuader influences the conduct of a person to the harm of
another who has some advantageous connection with the first, there are
yet to be mentioned certain qualifying elements which, when present,
render the conduct of the persuader unjustifiable, and result in a right-
duty relation between the persuader and the person injured. The
whole question, after all, is one of policy. If a man's methods are
[1892] A. C. 25.
'In the United States this field has been largely covered by federal and state
laws relating to unfair competition. For a recent discussion of the question see
Haines, Efforts to Define Unfair Competition (igig) 29 YALE LAw JotnAL., 1.
U Cohn & Roth Electric Co. v. Bricklayers' Union (917) 92 Conn. i6i, ioi
At. 659. But see contra Folson v. Lewis (i91) 2o8 Mass. 336, 94 N. E. 316.
And see recent legislation in Kansas establishing a so-called "Court" of In-
dustrial Relations, having supervision and control over all disputes in Kansas
between employer and employee arising in connection with public utilities, and in
connection with employments and industries dealing in the manufacture of cloth-
ing, the-mining and preparation of fuel, and in the transportation of food, fuel,
and clothing. Strikes, conspiracies to induce others to quit work, picketing, boy-
cotts, unjust discharge of employees, and lockouts are forbidden. Violations of
the act aie penalized. Three judges, appointed by the governor, constitute the
"Court." An appeal from the order of the "Court" may be carried to the
Supreme Court of the state. In case of an appeal the Supreme Court considers
the evidence adduced before the "Court' of Industrial Relations, but in the in-
terests of justice the Supreme Court may admit additional testimony. Laws of
Kansas, Special Session (ig2o) ch. 29.
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peaceful and his advice or persuasion tends merely to create a voluntary
desire on the part of another to act, the means used are said to be justi-
fiable and lawful. But if the means used result in. the act on the part
of the other without his unhampered wish they are said to be. unjusti-
fiable and unlawful.
The plaintiff was the owner of a boat which carried on a trade with
the natives of Africa. A canoe with natives on board came out to
establish a trade 'with the plaintiff's boat. The defendant, a rival
trader, whose boat was lying near, fired a cannon at the canoe, killing
one of the natives and frightening the rest, so that the plaintiff's trade
was interrupted. The court permitted the plaintiff to recover dam-,
ages." The same principle is pertinent in labor controversies. If the
means employed are coercive,05 either by resorting to violence or threats
of violence, e6 or where abusive language is used,8" or where conduct is
compelled by heavy fine,6" generally the privilege is denied and a legal
remedy is granted.
Privilege-no-right relations frequently arise in connection with
so-called accidental injuries. It should be noted that in these cases the
element of foresight is a necessary ingredient. When unintended harm
results from a man's conduct, and the average prudent man could not
have foreseen some kind of harm, no cause of action arises. The
harm not having been apparent, it is called an. accident. The leading
case of Brown v. Kendall9 illustrates this point. There it appeared
that the plaintiff's and defendant's dogs were fighting, and fhat the
defendant while seeking to separate them had raised a stick over his
shoulder in order to strike the dogs, and in so doing had accidentally
hit the plaintiff, injuring him. The court held that this act of the
defendant "was a lawful and proper act which he might do by proper
and safe means"; and that if "in doing this act, using due care and
all proper precautions necessary to the exigency of the case, to avoid
hurt to others, in raising his stick for that purpose he accidentally hit
the plaintiff in his eye, and wounded him, this was the result of pure
accident, or was involuntary and unavoidable, and therefore the action
would not lie."
In connection with privilege-no-right relations, a distinction should
be observed between legal duties and so-called "moral" duties. What
is considered a moral duty is often also a legal one, but in many. in-
" Tarleton v. McGawley .(i8o4, K. B.) Peake N. P. 2o5.
'Martell v. White (1904) 185 Mass..255, 69 N. E. 1o85.
"Iron Moulders' Union v. AIllis-Chambers Co. (19o8, C. C. A. 7th) 166 Fed. 45.
' Kolley v. Robinson (igii, C. C. A. 8th) 187 Fed. 415.
'Martell v'. White (i9o4) supra note 65. Cf. language by Taft, C. J., in
Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. (1894, C. C. S. D. Ohio) 62 Fed. 803,
817. See generally on this subject x Street, Foundations of Legal Liability (i9o6)
142-373, and 5 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (2d ed. igig) ch. 28.
" (8o, Mass.) 6 Cush. 292.
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stances conduct which is morally wrong is legally privileged. A, while
walking along a water-front, sees B drowning. A rope is at hand
which A can easily toss to B, yet A stands by and permits B to drown.
Morally A's conduct is m6st reprehensible, but legally it is privileged.
No legal duty arises no matter how small a risk or inconvenience is
involved.7 0  It is submitted that here are instanced facts where policy
is at fault. Some progressive legislation is called for.7' A Bentham
is needed.7 2
'"With the humane side of the question courts are not concerned. It is the
omission or negligent discharge of legal duties only which come within the sphere
of judicial cognizance. For withholding relief from the suffering, for failing to
respond to the calls of worthy charity, or for faltering in the bestowment of
brotherly love on the unfortunate, penalties are found not in the laws of man,
but in that higher law, the violation of which is condemned by the voice of con-
science, whose .sentence of punishment for the recreant act is swift and sure."
Union Pacific Ry. v. Cappier (i9o3) 66 Kan. 649, 653, 72 Pac. 281, 282. But cf.
Depue v. Flatau (19o7) Ioo Minn. 299, I1 N. W. I.
"See the Dutch Penal Code, art. 45o: "One who, witnessing the danger of
death with which another is suddenly threatened, neglects to give or furnish him
with such assistance as he can give or procure without reasonable fear of danger
to himself or to others, is to be punished, if the death of the person in distress
follows, by a detention of three months at most and an amende of three hundred
florins at most"
The German Civil Code, sec. 826 provides: "One, who designedly injures
another in the manner violating good morals, is bound to indemnify the other
for the injury."
See I Jeremy Bentham's Works (Browning's ed. 1843) f48: "The limits of
the law on this head seem, however, to be capable of being, extended a good deal
farther than they seem ever to have been extended hitherto. In particular, in
cases where the person is in danger, why should it not be made the duty of every
man to save another from mischief, when it can be done without prejudicing him-
self, as well as to abstain from bringing it upon himself?"
